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The Right of the People to Keep and Bear
Arms Shall Not Be Litigated Away:
Constitutional Implications of Municipal
Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry
WILLIAM L. McCosKEY"
INTRODUCTION
In America today, there are few issues as polarizing as the issue of guns. Whether
in the media, popular entertainment, sports, or daily life, guns evoke strong feelings
among most Americans.2 High-proffile acts of gun violence such as the Columbine
High School and the Long Island train shootings have done much to sway attitudes
about whether guns are inherently too unsafe for Americans to own. Many Americans
perceive an ever-increasing cycle of violence in our streets and, rightly or wrongly,
many consider guns to be at the heart of the problem.4 These strong feelings about
guns have led to greater legislative efforts to reduce the number of guns available to
the public.5 Organizations such as the National Rifle Association ("NRA") and Hand
Gun Control, Inc.6 have waged multimillion dollar lobbying efforts to affect the
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1992,
United States Military Academy---West Point. I am grateful to Professor David C. Williams
for his invaluable insights and advice concerning this Note. I thank my family and Jill Wheatley
for their unwavering love and support.
1. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-
CONTROL LAWS 1 (1998) (describing the polarization of viewpoints in American society
concerning gun ownership). See generally THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE: YOU DECIDE (Lee
Nisbet ed., 2001) (providing a collection of essays from all perspectives that offers a thorough
analysis of the divisiveness of gun control issues in America).
2. Lee Nisbet, Introduction, in THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE: You DECIDE, supra note 1,
at I I (providing an excellent overview of the strong viewpoints of Americans for or against
guns and gun control).
3. See Roger Rosenblatt, Get Rid ofthe Damned Things, reprinted in THE GUN CONTROL
DEBATE: YOU DECIDE, supra note 1, at 108. See generally THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE: A
DOCuMENTARY HISTORY 103 (Marjolijn Bijlefeld ed., 1997) (introducing numerous public
opinion polls reflecting views of gun ownership).
4. See generally DENNIS P. ROSENBAUMET AL, THE PREVENTION OFCRIME: SOCIALAND
SITUATIONAL STRATEGIES 90-93 (1998) (presenting statistics concerning Americans' beliefs
about the link between crime and guns); Guns in America: What Must Be Done, reprinted in
THE GUN CONTROLDEBATE: YOU DECIDE, supra note I, at 112; Barbara Kantrowitz, The New
Age of Anxiety, reprinted in THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE: YOU DECIDE, supra note 1, at 117.
5. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1994).
This law is commonly referred to as the "assault-weapons ban." See James Bovard, The
Assault-Weapons Scam, FREEDOM DAILY, March & April 1996, reprinted in THETYRANNYOF
GUNCONTROL 15 (Jacob G. Homberger & Richard M. Ebeling eds., 1997); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1994); Pub. L. No. 103-159 (1993) (the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act).
6. In 2001, Handgun Control, Inc. changed its moniker to The Brady Campaign to
Prevent Gun Violence. See The Lobby Report: A Semiannual Newsletter of Changes Made,
THE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS YELLOW BOOK (July 6, 2001) at
http://www.leadershipdirectories.com/fingayb3.htm.
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outcome of gun control legislation or the course of national elections." Whatever the
average American may think about guns, clearly the United States is unique in
comparison with other Western nations because so large a proportion of the
population is armed." The prevalence of guns in America will likely ensure that the
controversy over guns and gun violence remains at the center of policy debate.
America's big cities have long suffered from urban violence such as gang warfare,
and too often guns are involved in such violence.' The cost to urban America of the
high levels of gun violence has a dimension beyond the cost in lives-big cities are
also shouldering a huge financial burden in medical costs and the cost of greater
policng efforts in response to the violence."0 In the past several years, many large
municipalities have responded to this trend by filing suit against gun manufacturers."
It is not surprising that municipalities would pursue this tactic, especially in light
7. See, e.g., Analysis: What is the NRA?, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/332555.stm (Mar. 1,2000) (noting that the NRA's
1995 lobbying budget amounted to "around $30 million," and that in 1998, "the NRA
succeeded in seeing 247 preferred candidates elected out of 310 races" for seats in the
Congress).
8. See LOTT, supra note 1, at 1 (estimating that "75 to 86 million people [in America]
own a total of about 200-240 million guns"). See generally DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI,
THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER
DEMOCRACIES? (1992) (contrasting American gun ownership history, attitudes, and levels with
those of several other civilized nations).
9. See RAYMOND B. FLANNERY, JR., VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 74 (2000) (arguing that guns
and drugs are an integral feature of urban gang-related crime); see also Nisbet, supra note 1,
at 13 (citing federal crime statistics estimating that in 1993 alone, of 39,595 Americans killed
with guns, handguns accounted for approximately 71%, or 27,726, of the killings).
10. See Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding
Firearms: Tort Litigation Against Firearm Manufacturers and Constitutional Challenges to
Gun Laws, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1713, 1715-16 (1999) ("The lifetime medical costs of firearm-
related injuries occurring in 1994 has been estimated at $2.3 billion, of which nearly half...
was paid through public funds."); see also Winifred Weitsen Boyle, Comment, There's No
Smoking Gun: Cities Should Not Sue the Firearm Industry, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 219
(2000) ("Cities are no longer simply counting bodies when focusing on the damage associated
with guns.... [They] are now viewing the issue from the pocketbook perspective .... ).
11. Thomas F. Segalla, Governmental and Individual Claims in Gun Litigation and
Coverage, in INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE NEw MILENNIUM at 363, 379-97 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study, Jan. 13, 2000). Following New Orleans's lead, the following municipalities
have filed suit against the gun industry since October 30, 1998: Bridgeport, Connecticut;
Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Cook County, Illinois; Miami-Dade County, Florida;
Cleveland, Ohio; Cincinnati, Ohio; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Detroit, Michigan; Wayne
County, Michigan; Newark, New Jersey;, San Francisco, Berkeley, Sacramento, Los Angeles
and Los Angeles County, Compton, West Hollywood, San Mateo County, and Alameda
County, California; St. Louis, Missouri; Camden County and Camden, New Jersey; Boston,
Massachusetts; Gary, Indiana; and Wilmington, Delaware. Id. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
Providence, Rhode Island, and New York City expressed interest injoining the increasing tide
of litigation. See id.
A number of these lawsuits were subsequently dismissed; discussion of the dispositions of
these and other municipal cases may be found infra Part Ill.
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of the largely successful legal battles against the tobacco industry in recent years. 2 To
be sure, there are theoretical similarities between the litigation against the tobacco
industry and the growing wave of litigation against the gun industry. Like the plaintiff
states in the tobacco litigation, the plaintiff cities in the recent gun litigation may point
to the huge costs in terms of health care costs consequent to use of the defendants'
products, and may actually hope to recover similar money damages. 3 As will be
showninthis Note, however, the municipalities often have underlying motives that do
not correspond to the financial motives of the states in the tobacco litigation.
4
Moreover, in contrast to the tobacco suits, the municipal lawsuits against the gun
industry have troubling constitutional implications, regardless of the applicable tort
theories underlying the various suits. That is, unlike tobacco, guns have a
constitutionally protected status in America. 5
Much has been written about the substantive and procedural strengths and
weaknesses of municipal lawsuits against the gun industry; much of this material
centers on the merits of this litigation under tort law. 6 In contrast, little has been
written on the subject of the constitutional implications of antigun litigation by
municipalities, perhaps because defendant gun manufacturers have rarely asserted the
Second Amendment as a defense against municipal claims.' This Note will explore
12. See Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation and Societal Values, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1353, 1361-
62 (2000) (proposing that "tobacco litigation has made gun litigation possible"); see also
Vemick & Teret, supra note 10, at 1745 (suggesting that tobacco litigation has made other
lawful products susceptible to a similar strategy); Jerry J. Phillips, The Relation of
Constitutional and Tort Law to Gun Injuries and Deaths in the United States, 32 CONN. L.
REv. 1337, 1348 (2000) (proposing that both cigarettes and guns are "unlikely to be made safe
after leaving the manufacturer's hands").
13. Bogus, supra note 12, at 1365-66 ("By November 1998, the tobacco industry settled
these cases, agreeing to pay the states... a total of $242.8 billion.").
14. See infra Part 111.
15. Because the Second Amendment specifically mentions a right to keep and bear arms,
guns are necessarily protected to a certain extent by the Constitution, whether under a
collective or individual righs theory. See Phillips, supra note 12, at 1337.
16. See, e.g., Timothy A. Bumann, A Products Liability Response to Gun Control
Litigation, 19 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 715 (1995); Traci 0. Peterson, Comment & Note,
Legislation or Litigation: How Do We Solve the Problem of Gun Violence in Our
Communities?, 68 UMKC L. REv. 483 (2000).
17. See Phillips, supra note 12, at 1339 ("Curiously, the Second Amendment... [has] not
usuallybeen raised as [a] defenseo in [lawsuits against gun manufacturers]."). In fact, the very
idea of invoking the amendment as a defense against such lawsuits has been ridiculed by those
supporting these lawsuits. See, e.g., Daryl Lindsey, Gun Smoke: Can the UnprecedentedLegal
Challenge to Gun Manufacturers Withstand the Counterattack of the NRA and Bob Barr?,
SALON (Mar. I1, 1999),.at http://www.salon.com/news/l1999/03/llnewsb.htnl (citing an
interview with TomDiaz, a senior policy analyst at the antigun Violence Policy Center). When
asked if the gun manufacturers were protected by the Second Amendment, Diaz responded,
"The Second Amendment argument ... is just fruitless-it's probably the most bogus
articulation of all." Id.
Interestingly, in November 1999, the Second Amendment Foundation, with help from
constitutional law professors nationwide, filed suit against the U.S. Conference ofMayors and
the mayors of many cities involved in antigun litigation. See Edward Winter Trapolin,
2002]
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how these lawsuits may implicate the Second Amendment in light of the recent
ground-breaking Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Emerson,"8 in which for the first
time in history a federal appeals court concluded that there is an individual right to
keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment.19
Part I of this Note will briefly analyze the text of the Second Amendment and the
subsequent treatment by the United States Supreme Court, lower courts, and legal
scholars representing the modem interpretations of the amendment. Part H will
evaluate the dramatic development in Second Amendment jurisprudence exemplified
by Emerson, which in turn may have a profound impact on finally settling the question
of whether Americans have a constitutionally recognized individual right to keep and
bear arms. In addition, Part II will consider the debate over the applicability of the
Second Amendment to the states through incorporation via the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 ° Part II will ultimately conclude that the weight of authority supports
the view that the Framers intended the Second Amendment to guarantee an individual
right to keep and bear arms, that the right is secured against the states via
incorporation, and that the Fifth Circuit in Emerson properly came to its conclusion.2'
Part III begins with a summary of the short history of municipal lawsuits against the
gun industry. This summary will consider the various theories of tort liability under
which the plaintiff municipalities have proceeded, and will briefly evaluate the
outcomes of a sampling of such cases. This Note will consider the motives of plaintiff
municipalities beyond seeking damages under the traditional tort theoriesunderlying
these lawsuits. These motives, this Note will argue, are especially important in light
of the constitutional implications of these lawsuits.
Finally, Part M will explore these implications in light of Emerson. These lawsuits
Comment, Sued into Submission: Judicial Creation of Standards in the Manufacture and
Distribution of Lawful Products-The New Orleans Lawsuit Against Gun Manufacturers, 46
Loy. L. REV. 1275, 1292 (2000). The suit alleged among other things that the defendants, by
their litigation, "conspired 'to violate civil and constitutional rights, including the First, Second
and Ninth Amendments... ."' Id. at 1292-93 (emphasis added).
18. 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).
19. Id. at 260. A more detailed analysis of Emerson follows in Part II.
20. See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (containing conflicting language
concerning the incorporation of the Second Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment). Compare Richard E. Gardiner, ToPreserveLiberty--A Lookat theRightto Keep
and Bear Arms, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 63 (1982) (finding incorporation in Presser), with Martin
C. Ashman, Handgun Control by Local Government, ION. KY. L. REV. 97 (1982) (finding no
incorporation in Presser).
21. It would be an understatement to say that Emerson, representing the law of only one
federal circuit court of appeals and coinciding with but one view of the meaning ofthe Second
Amendment, does not provide the final word on this. To attempt to give full justice to the
debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment would require a lengthy exegesis beyond
the confines of this Note. At any rate, the academic writings debating the differing
interpretations of the amendment are extensive. See, e.g., Emerson, 270 F.3d at 218 n.9, 220
n. 12 (providing an excellent index to much more thorough academic writings devoted to the
differing interpretations of the Second Amendment). This Note provides an abbreviated
analysis of the evolution of the two main opposing theories of the Second Amendment,
culminating in the recentEmerson decision, and ultimately concludes that the individual rights
theory is the correct one. See infra Part I.
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are troubling-aside from any tort law ramifications-because the lawsuits amount
to abuse of court process that may violate constitutional rights. Part M will consider,
by analogy to the First Amendment, the ramifications of antigun litigation by the
government. This Part will also briefly consider the extent to which antigun litigation
improperly substitutes for legitimate legislative means of policing or restricting gun
ownership. In other words, even if individual ownership of guns is subject to
restriction under the United States Constitution,' antigun litigation has the practical
effect of usurping the legislatures' proper role in enacting such restrictions.
The municipal lawsuits take on a new dimension in light of the individual rights
theory espoused by the Fifth Circuit in Emerson and the ascendant view in academia
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms. This Note will
illustrate the constitutional fallacies of the cities resorting to the courts as a means of
effectivelybanning gun ownership. Whether one agrees with individual gun ownership
in America as a policy matter, the proper way to address gun violence problems is
throughlegislation, orpossiblyby amendingthe Constitution-notthrougha frivolous
manipulation of the legal system that amounts to an end-run around the legislatures
and the Constitution.
I. THE BATTLE OVER THE MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
For a constitutional provision that at first glance has reasonably clear language, the
Second Amendment is subject to widely varying interpretations. The amendment
states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.' 'u Many different
readings of the true meaning of the Second Amendment exist, but the various
interpretations may be broadly divided into two camps: the individual rights theory
andthe collective rights theory.' In general, the individual rights theorists believe that
22. In Emerson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Constitution protected an individual
right to keep and bear arms, but the right is subject to reasonable restrictions. See infra Part
II.B for a discussion of Emerson.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
24. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62
TENN. L.REv. 461 (1995). Professor Reynolds separates the two opposing theories broadly into
the "Standard Model" (individual tights theories) and "non-Standard Model" (all non-
individual rights theories), id. at 462-64. See also David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Other
Thirty-Five Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18
ST. LOUIS U.PUB. L. REV. 99, 100-04 (1999); Anthony Gallia, Comment, "Your Weapons, You
Will Not Need Them." Comment on the Supreme Court's Sixty-Year Silence on the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 33 AKRON L. REV. 131, 136 (1999).
It should be noted thatnot all theories of the Second Amendment may be neatly divided into
the individual rights or collective tights categories. See, e.g., David C. Williams, Civic
Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The TerrifyingSecondAmendment, 101 YALEL.J. 551
(1991). Professor Williams argues that the Second Amendment guaranteed the right of a
virtuous and universal citizen militia to keep and bear arms, but today's gun-owning society
is neither united by virtue nor universal. Id. at 590-94. Because the conditions present at the
time of the drafting of the Second Amendment are nonexistent today, the basic purpose of the
amendment cannot be fulfilled today. "[The Framers] did not intend to leave the universality
of the militia to the chance decision of every citizen to arm herself." Id. at 593; see also
2002]
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the Second Amendment protects the right of individual citizens to keep and bear
arms,' while the collective rights theorists argue that the right to keep and bear arms
is a collective right belonging to the people as a whole.2 To add to the confusion, the
Supreme Court has been mostly and conspicuously silent on the extent of the right for
the over two hundred years since the ratification of the Second Amendment In fact,
the most complete Supreme Court treatment of the Second Amendment was decided
in 1939, and this decision did nothing to conclusively settle the issue.2' In light of this
silence and the differing interpretations of lower courts, legal scholars, and interest
groups, the rights secured by the Second Amendment have been viewed in very
different ways. Until fairly recently, however, many constitutional scholars simply
ignored or marginalized the Second Amendment as relatively unimportant in the study
of constitutional law.2"
This Part will explore the varying theories of the meaning of the Second
Amendment. Because of the huge body of writings that comprise the academic debate
over the meaning of the amendment, this exploration in no way can adequately cover
the entire spectrum of the debate. However, this Part will generally summarize the
interpretation debate by contrasting the views of the lower courts since the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller with the evolving doctrine in academia. This Note will
consider the ground-breaking Emerson case, the rationale of which aptly summarizes
the varying interpretations of the meaning of the Second Amendment and holds that
Reynolds, supra, at 486.
25. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecondAmendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637
(1989). See generally JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994) (arguing that the American people inherited a tradition of an
individual right to keep and bear arms from an English heritage).
26. See, e.g., Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5,58 (1989)
(arguing that the Second Amendment guarantees an outmoded, collective right of arms
ownership to the states' militias); Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False
Consciousness andDereliction ofDialogicResponsibility, 75 B.U. L. REv. 57 (1995) (arguing
that the Second Amendment protects only a collective right, and that the individual rights
theory is nothing more than a politically derived invention of modem special interests).
27. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Milleris infamously ambiguous, and
it is frequently cited by both sides in the Second Amendment debate. See Eugene Volokh et al.,
The Second Amendment as Teaching Tool in Constitutional Law Classes, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC.
591, 604 (1998) (discussing the use of Miller as a teaching tool, Professor Volokh describes
the case as "deliciously and usefully ambiguous"). The limited scope of Miller is discussed
later in this Part. For a detailed analysis of what the Supreme Court has said about the Second
Amendment in Miller and in thirty-five other cases, see generally Kopel, supra note 24
(providing case-by-case excerpts of language concerning the meaning of the Second
Amendment).
28. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 640 ("[Legal scholars have relegated the Second
Amendment] to footnotes; it becomes what a deconstructionist might call a 'supplement' to the
ostensibly 'real' Constitution that is privileged by discussion in the text."). The study of the
Second Amendment is a relatively recent phenomenon. While there probably is not a single
explanation for the rising interest in the Second Amendment, it seems likely that the sharp
increase in gun violence (and subsequent gun control laws) is a likely cause. See Reynolds,
supra note 24, at 461.
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the individual rights view is the correct one. Ultimately, this Part concludes that the
scholarly evidence supporting the individual rights theory is most persuasive, and that
this view is well supported by the Fifth Circuit Emerson decision.
A. Court Interpretations of the Second Amendment
Any meaningful interpretation ofconstitutional provisions necessarily looks to the
text of the Constitution itself. Thus, modem Second Amendment theorists, whether
of the individual or collective rights bent, point to support for their respective views
in the text of the Second Amendment, the writings of various constitutional Framers,
and other interpretational constructs.29 Many legal scholars have meticulously parsed
the words of the amendment, considered the context of the amendment in comparison
to other provisions of the Constitution, and evaluated the history of the Constitution,
coming down as either individual or collective rights advocates." Traditional
historians have recently entered the fray, arguing thatthe cultural history ofAmericans
points either to one or the other interpretation.3'Police officers,32 prominent jurists,33
and attorneys of the Justice Department,' have issued their proclamations for, or
29. See Levinson, supra note 25 at 640. Professor Levinson discusses six approaches
("modalities") of constitutional argument used by both sides: textual, historical, structural,
doctrinal, prudential, and ethical. Id. at 643.
30. Id. at 643-51.
31. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 25 (offering a historian's argument that Americans
inherited an individual right to keep and bear arms from our English forebears); MICHAEL A.
BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA (2000) (offering a historian's analysis supporting collective
rights theory by attempting to debunk progun claims that gun ownership was common in early
America).
32. See David B. Kopel,Background Checks and WaitingPeriods, in GUNS, WHO SHOULD
HAVE THEM? 53, 66 (David B. Kopel ed., 1995) (indicating that in a survey of police officers
in the South, "90.1 percent thought the United States Constitution guaranteed the right of law-
abiding citizens to own guns").
33. In 1991, retired ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger said ofthe Second Amendment: "[The
amendment] has been the subject of one of the greatest pieces of fraud ... on the American
people by public interest groups that I have ever seen in my life .... [The NRA] has misled the
American people ... [and] they have had far too much influence on the Congress .... The
MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, December 16, 1991); see also Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A powerful lobby dins
into the ears of our citizenry that these gun purchases are constitutional rights protected by the
Second Amendment... . Our decisions belie that argument, for the Second Amendment...
was designed to keep alive the militia."). But see Kopel, supra note 24 (providing numerous
Supreme Court Justice quotations that support an individual right to keep and bear arms).
34. Even among prominent attorneys for the United States, there is hardly consensus as
to the meaning of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Arguments, United
States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), at
http://www.akrepublicans.org/22ndlegtpdf/infosjr01720392001.pdf (last visited Nov. 21,
2001). William B. Mateja, Attorney of the United States, responded thus to questions of the
three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit.
Judge Garwood: You are saying that the Second Amendment is consistent with
a position that you can take guns away from the public? You can restrict
2002]
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against, the individual right to keep and bear arms.
But the members of the Supreme Court, whose opinions are obviously the most
important in interpreting the meaning of the Second Amendment, have remained
conspicuously silent on the issue in comparison to their voluminous treatments of
other portions of the Bill of Rights. 5 The rigorous debate in scholarly and
nonscholarly circles on the meaning of the Second Amendment will be largely moot
if and when the Supreme Court rules conclusively on the meaning of the amendment.
Because the Fifth Circuit recently articulated a view in Emerson contrary to the
expressed views of other federal circuits, however, it is possible that the Court may
eventually resolve any circuit split and conclusively decide the issue. The Court,
however, has successfully evaded confronting the issue squarely. 6
To date, however, the most complete Court treatment of the scope of the Second
Amendment took place in 1939, in United States v. Miller.37 In Miller, two men were
charged with violations of the National Firearms Act ("NFA")33 by transporting a
sawed-off shotgun 9 across state lines. The defendants claimed that the NFA violated
ownership of rifles, pistols and shotguns from all people? Is that the position of
the United States?
Mateja: Yes.
Judge Garwood: Is it theposition of the United States that persons who are not
in theNational Guard are afforded no protections under the Second Amendment?
Mateja: Exactly.
Id.
Then-Solicitor General Seth Waxman confirmed that the views expressed by Mr. Mateja
indeed reflected the position of the United States as supported by"the Supreme Court and eight
United States Courts of Appeals [that] have considered the scope of the Second Amendment
and have uniformly rejected arguments that it extends firearms rights to individuals ...."
Letter from Seth Waxman, Solicitor General of the United States, to Anonymous Recipient
(Aug. 22, 2000), at http://www.rkba.org/federalldoj/waxman-emerson.html (last visited Mar.
2, 2002). Compare the views of Mateja and Waxman with those of current Attorney General
John Ashcroft: "[L]et me state unequivocally my view that the text and the original intent of
the Second Amendment clearly protect the right of individuals to keep and bear firearms."
Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, to James J. Baker, Executive
Director of the National Rifle Association (May 17, 2001), at
http://www.nraila.org/images/Ashcroft.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
For a more recent exposition of the current Justice Department's official view concerning
the Second Amendment, see infra note 149.
35. See Herz, supra note 26, at 77 & n.74 ("For more than fifty years, the Supreme Court
has consistently refused to expound on Miller. The Court has denied certiorari in at least nine
cases in which the lower courts relied on Millerto reject Second Amendment challenges."). But
see Kopel, supra note 24 (recounting in detail the statements of various Supreme Court Justices
supporting an individual right, and suggesting that "the Court has not been so silent as the
conventional wisdom suggests").
36. See, e.g., Gallia, supra note 24, at 134. The Supreme Court recently chose not to
review the Fifth Circuit's Emerson decision. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
37. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
38. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1994).
39. A shotgun with a barrel length less than eighteen inches is a firearm as defined under
the National Firearms Act, id. § 5845, the transportation of which is in violation of the National
Firearms Act. Id § 5861.
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the Second Amendment, and the district court agreed, quashing the government
indictment 4' On appeal, the Courtreversed and remanded the case back to the district
court, finding that the Second Amendment did not protect the right to keep and bear
a weapon such as a sawed-off shotgun."' Justice McReynolds, writing for the Court,
observed:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
"shotgun having a barrel less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial
notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that
its use could contribute to the common defense.42
Ironically, this treatment has been seized upon by both sides to find support for
their respective interpretations of the Second Amendment.43 Some individual rights
theorists claim that, if anything, the Court's language in Miller-relating to whether
a sawed-off shotgun would serve a "military" purpose in furtherance of the common
defense-suggests that individuals have the right to bear arms that are military in
nature (and therefore "assault weapon" bans would be unconstitutional).' Collective
rights theorists claim that Miller shows that the Second Amendment "must be
interpreted and applied to 'assure the continuation and render possible the
effectiveness' of state militias, not to assure the continuation (or creation) of a nation
armed with military weapons for personal protection." '
The confusion surrounding Miller has given lower courts plenty of ammunition to
interpret the Second Amendment (or to push it aside altogether) as they see fit. For
example, in Quilici v. Village ofMorton Grove, the Seventh Circuit expresslyrejected
an Illinois man's Second Amendment challenge of a local ordinance banning handgun
possession.' The court held that "the right to keep and bear arms is inextricably
connected to the preservation of a militia," reasoning that"this is precisely the manner
in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Second Amendment in [Miller].""7
Because handguns were not "military weapons," the city's ordinance banning
40. Miller, 307 U.S. at 177.
41. Id. at 178.
42. Id.
43. Indeed, virtually all relevant case law has "been embraced by both sides in the gun
control debate." Reynolds, supra note 24, at 496; see also Volokh et al., supra note 27.
44. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 654-55 ("Ironically, Miller can be read to support
some of the most extreme anti-gun control arguments, e.g., that the individual citizen has a
right to keep and bearbazookas, rocket launchers, and other armaments that are clearlyrelevant
to modem warfare including... assault weapons.").
45. See Herz, supra note 26, at 68-69 (arguing that the Court's express language
evaluating the appropriateness of the sawed-off shotgun for use in a "militia" clearly reflects
a collective right as part of a state-organized military unit); see also Ashman, supra note 20.
46. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 270.
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handguns did not violate the Second Amendment.
The federal courts, to varying degrees, have similarly fixated on the "militia"
wording of the Second Amendment and interpreted Miller to mean that there is no
individual right to keep and bear arms." With the exception of the district court and
court of appeals decisions in Emerson, the federal courts that have considered the
scope of the Second Amendment have taken the view that the amendment extends
only to the protection of a collective right in the context of membership in state
militias.
50
B. Evolving Interpretations of the Second Amendment
Despite Miller and its lower court progeny, a sizeable and growing bloc in
academia maintains that the Second Amendment affords an individual right to arms. '
Most of these academic arguments hinge on the respective meanings of "the people"
and of "militia" in the wording inthe Second Amendment.52 Individual rights theorists
emphasize the word "people," and place less emphasis on the mention of "militia,"
and thus are more likely to argue that the mention of "militia" simply reinforces the
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms is held by the states, not private citizens); Love v. Pepersack,
47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Second Amendment does not confer an absolute
individual right); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that the Second
Amendment guarantees a collective right, not an individual right); Cases v. United States, 131
F.2d 916 (1 st Cir. 1942) (stating that the federal government may restrict keeping and bearing
of arms by a single individual); see also Herz, supra note 26, at 74 ("Every federal appellate
decision since Miller has rejected the broad-individual-rights position and focused instead on
whether use of a weapon was related to maintenance of a well-regulated militia.").
50. See the cases listed supra note 49. See also United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203,
217-21, 218 nn.10-11 (5th Cir. 2001).
51. See David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardiner, The Sullivan Principles: Protecting the
SecondAmendmentfrom CivilAbuse, 19 SETON HALLLEGIS. J. 737, 741 (1995), available at
http://www.westlaw.com. Kopel and Gardiner assert:
While the legal academy may be divided in regard to the constitutionality of
particular gun control, there are few subjects on which legal scholarship is as
unanimous as the original intent of the Second Amendment. There is not a
professor of law in the United States in the last twenty-five years who has signed
his name to a law journal article asserting that the Second Amendment was not
intended to recognize an individual right.
Id.; see also Emerson, 270 F.3d at 220 ("The individual rights view has enjoyed considerable
academic endorsement, especially in the last two decades."); cf Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and
Found: Researching the SecondAmendment, 76 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 349,381 (recognizing that
while there is a growing body of pro-individual rights articles in academia, there are extensive
writings taking the contrary view, and the pro-individual rights view is by no means the
dominant view of the Second Amendment in academia).
52. For contrasting views, see, for example, Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right ofthe People
or the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26
VAL. U. L. REv. 131 (1991), and Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy, and the Second
Amendment, 26 VAL U. L. REv. 107 (1991).
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Framers' fears of a standing army in the hands of a despotic federal government.53
Historian Joyce Lee Malcolm succinctly summarized this argument:
The Second Amendment was meant to accomplish two distinct goals, each
perceived as crucial to the maintenaice of liberty. First, it was meant to
guarantee the individual's right to have arms for self-defence....
The second and related objective concerned the militia, and it is the coupling
of these two objectives that has caused the most confusion. The customary
American militia necessitated an armed public....
The clause concerning the militia was not intended to limit ownership of arms
to militia members, or [to] return control of the militia to the states, but rather
to express the preference for a militia over a standing army.
4
Thus, under this interpretation, the "militia" refers not to a specialized body of
armed individuals (such as a modem National Guard units), but instead to the
commonly held view that an armed populace, or "militia," was the surest way of
protecting freedom' s
Extensive writings by the Framers of the Constitution and the subsequent Bill of
Rights further support the individual rights view of the meaning of "militia." James
Madison, in The FederalistNo. 46, wrote that he considered an armedpopulace a sure
safeguard against the evils of a standing army.' George Mason said, "Who are the
militia? They are the wholepeople, except a fewpublic officers."58 Tench Coxe wrote,
'The militia, who are in fact the effective part of the people at large, will render many
troops quite unnecessary. They will form a powerful check upon the regular troops,
and will generally be sufficient to overawe them"" For a standing army to rule, wrote
Noah Webster, "the people must be disarmed."
These views of various Framers show that armed individual citizens comprised the
"militia" that the Framers felt was so necessary to protecting the freedom of the
country fromthe evils of an unrestrained standing army. These views also tend to cast
doubt on the collective rights theorists' belief that the modem-day National Guard
fulfills the "militia" reference. The collective rights view becomes especially tenuous
when one considers the Supreme Court's holding in Perpich v. Department of
53. See, e.g., LESADAMS,THESECONDAMENDMENTPRIMER 113-27(1996) (summarizing
late eighteenth-century views on the need to protect the newly formed country from a tyrannical
standing army).
54. MALCOLM, supra note 25, at 162-63.
55. Id.
56. See Williams, supra note 24, at 589 ("Those who support a states rights view of the
militia seek to identify the Amendment's militia with the National Guard .... The universal
militia ... was the people under another name .... As the National Guard is-not universal, it
cannot serve as a substitute.").
57. ADAMS, supra note 53, at 100.
58. Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 104 (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 105.
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Defense,6 in which the Court recognized that the federal government has final
authority over the use and deployment of the states'. National Guard units.' It seems
unlikely that the Framers, who so distrusted a "standing army" under the control of the
federal government, would embrace the idea that "militia" equates to the National
Guard, especially when the federalization of the National Guard places them in the
same category as a standing army."
The meaning of "the people" in the text of the Second Amendment has also been
the subject of vigorous debate. Some collective rights theorists claim that"the people"
has a collective connotation." For example, one common variation on this theme
argues that state constitutions "regularly used 'man' or 'person' in regard to
'individual rights such as freedom of conscience' whereas the use in those
constitutions of the term 'the people' in regard to a right to bear arms is intended to
refer to the 'sovereign citizenry' collectively organized." ' As Professor Sanford
Levinson points out, however, "such an argument flounders.., upon examination of
the federal Bill of Rights itself and the usage there of the term 'the people' in the First,
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments."
Professor Levinson's point is further supported by the Supreme Court's opinion
in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a case that evaluated the extent of Fourth
Amendment application to noncitizens who had no connection to the United States.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, wrote:
The "people" seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the
Constitution .... The Second Amendment protects "the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms," and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that
certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to "the people"....
While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that "the
people" protected... by the First and Second Amendments ... refers to a
class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.6"
61. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
62. Id. at 348 ('Notwithstanding the brief periods of federal service, the members of the
state Guard unit continue to satisfy [the] description of a militia.").
63. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUlONAL RIGHT 169 (2d ed. 1994). Halbrook points out that
[t]hose who argue that the U.S. armed forces and National Guard--both standing
armies, whose weapons are owned by the federal government and not by the
soldier-now take the place of the militia have a sense of confidence in standing
armies and in the rulers that Justice Story would have considered naive.
Id. Halbrook refers to Justice Story's exposition stressing "the right of the citizens to keep and
bear arms has justly been consideredo] as the palladium of the liberties of the republic." Id.
(quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARiES ON THE CONSTITUTION 708 (1833)).
64. See Gallia, supra note 24, at 137, 144-46.
65. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 645.
66. Id.
67. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
68. Id. at 265.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's comments reinforce the notion that it would be absurd to
read the First and Fourth Amendments, with their references to "the people," as
anything other than protecting individual rights.69 As Professor Levinson points out,
"[i]t is difficult to know how one might plausibly read the Fourth Amendment as
[anything] other than a protection of individual rights."70 Similarly, "it would
approach the frivolous to read the assembly and petition clause as referring only to the
right of state legislatures to meet and pass a remonstrance directed to Congress or the
President against some government act."7'
Even in the face of such strong evidence supporting the individual rights view,
lower courts have foiund it all too easy to apply a collective rights reading of Miller
to sidestep the growing view in academia that the Second Amendment secures an
individual right.72 Courts have uniformly disposed of Second Amendment defenses
in criminal firearms cases by holding that the government did not infringe defendants'
rights because any rights under the Second Amendment were collective rights held by
states, not individual rights held by citizens.73 In 1999, however, a federal district
court decision in Texas marked a significant departure from conventional judicial
treatment and brought the Second Amendment rights controversy to the center of the
judicial stage.
II. EMERSONAND THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS THEORY
A. The Emerson Bombshell Part One
In United States v. Emerson,74 the district court considered the question of whether
the Second Amendment provides an individual right to keep and bear arms. Emerson,
the defendant, had been placed under a temporary restraining order as part of a form
69. Kopel and'Gardiner further argue that
[u]nless one is prepared to argue that the First Amendment "right of the people
peaceably to assemble" protects onlyNational Guard meetings, and the Fourth
Amendment "right of the people" to freedom from unreasonable searches
guarantees only the security of National Guard footlockers, it is impossible to
coherently maintain that the Second Amendment "right of the people" belongs
to the National Guard or the states, rather than to the.people ....
Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 51, at 740; see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (rejecting the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment "liberty
encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal
interference by the express provisions of the first eight Amendments.")
70. Levinson, supra note 25, at 645.
71. !d.
72. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
74. 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd, 270 F.3d 203 (5th. Cir. 2001), cert
denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002) (mem.). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal
of the charges against Emerson. See infra text accompanying notes 137-45. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court as to its finding that the Second Amendment guaranteed an
individual right to keep and bear arms. Id.
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order frequently used in Texas divorce proceedings." Unbeknownst to Emerson, he
was then subject to federal criminal prosecution "merely for possessing a firearm
while being subject to the order."'76 He was later charged with violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8),' which precludes gun possession by individuals under restraining orders
that prohibit harassment, stalking, or threats, among other things.7" Emerson moved
to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the federal statute is an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional power in violation of the Second, Fifth, and Tenth
Amendments, as well as the Commerce Clause. 9
With regard to his Second Amendment claim, Emerson asserted that he had a
constitutionally guaranteed right to keep and bear arms. ° The government responded
that "it is 'well settled' that the Second Amendment creates a right held by the States
and does notprotect an individual right to bear arms."'" The court, acknowledging that
this was a case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, held that the Second
Amendment indeed guaranteed an individual right to keep and bear arms. 2 Judge
Cummings wrote, "The rights of the Second Amendment should be as zealously
guarded as the other individualliberties enshrined in the Bill ofRights."' In expressly
finding that an individual right existed, Judge Cummings departed from the commonly
assumed, narrow holding of Miller-and the holdings of other federal courts, such as
those of the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. These interpretations held that the
Second Amendment guarantees a collective right, not an individual right."
What immediately set Emerson apart from other lower court decisions concerning
75. Id. at 599.
76. Id.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) provides in relevant part:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(8) who is subject to a court order that-
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice,
and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(13) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an
intimate partner of such person or child of [same], or engaging in other
conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily
injury to the partner or child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would
reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; .... To ship or transport in
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
78. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. at 599.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 600.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 610.
84. Id. at 607-08 (emphasis added).
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the Second Amendment was Judge Cummings's extensive analysis of the alternative
meanings of the amendment. While other courts had been quick to jump on the narrow
collective rights reading of Miller in quickly dispensing with any individualist reading
of the SecondAmendment, 5 Judge Cummings undertooka detailed textual, historical,
and structural analysis to conclude that the amendment does, in fact, guarantee an
individual right to arms. He stressed that the Court in Miller "did not answer the
crucial question of whether the Second Amendment embodies an individual or
collective right to bear arms."'86 Because the Court placed great emphasis on whether
a sawed-off shotgun had any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia, it was clear that the Court "chose a very narrow way to rule
on the issue of gun possession under the Second Amendment, and left for another day
further questions of Second Amendment construction."" Thus, Judge Cummings
concluded, "[i]t is difficult to interpret Miller as rendering the Second Amendment
meaningless as a control on Congress.""'
Finally, Judge Cummings concluded that prudential "concerns about the social
costs of enforcing the Second Amendment must be outweighed by considering the
lengths to which the federal courts have gone to uphold other rights in the
Constitution." 9 Because the "rights of the Second Amendment should be as zealously
guarded as the other individual liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights," Judge
Cummings found § 922(g)(8) to be unconstitutional because it allowed the
government to deprive Emerson of his constitutional rights without any particularized
findings that Emerson posed a threat of future violence.' In addition, because
Emerson had no notice that he was subject to federal criminal prosecution for firearms
possession upon being placed under a divorce proceeding restraining order, "it [was]
unfair to hold him accountable for his otherwise lawful actions."'" Thus, § 922(g)(8)
violated Emerson's Fifth Amendment due process rights as well, because the statute
is "an obscure, highly technical statute with no mens rea requirement...."I
A storm of controversy erupted in the immediate aftermath of the district court
decision. Many collective rights theorists criticized what they saw as an erroneous
departure from clear case law in an attempt to create a new right where one did not
exist.93 The individual rights theorists, however, were quick to applaud Judge
85. See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983).
86. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
87. Id. at 608-09.
88. Id. at 608.
89. Id. at610.
90. Id. Judge Cummings distinguished this deprivation ofSecond Amendment rights from
the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), because "once an individual is convicted
of a felony, he has by his criminal conduct taken himself outside the class of law-abiding
citizens who enjoy full exercise of their civil rights." Id. at 611.
91. Id. at612.
92. Id. at 613.
93. See, e.g., Chris Newton, Legal ScholarsDebateLandmarkSecondAmmendment [sic]
-Ruling in Texas, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 7, 1999, available at
http:llwww.reportemews.com/1999/texastlegaIO907.htrl. A Harvard law professorjoined fifty-
one other legal scholars in signing onto an amicus brief denouncing Judge Cummings'
interpretation of the Second Amendment, remarking, " hat decision and the opinion were a
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Cummings's ruling as taking an intellectually honest view of the meaning of the
Second Amendment." The district court's decision attracted much attention fromboth
sides in the debate, and when the government appealed the decision, the attention
focused on the Fifth Circuit.
B. The Emerson Bombshell Part Two
Emerson's case went to a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit." The federal
government challenged the district court's dismissal on Second and Fifth Amendment
grounds.' Emerson argued that the court should affirm the district court's dismissal
because § 922(g)(8) requires that the "predicate court order include an explicit finding
that the person enjoined posed a credible threat of violence" and that the predicate
order be supported by "sufficient evidence before the court ... to sustain such a
fimding." The court rejected Emerson's arguments as to the construction of §
922(g)(8), using standard rules of statutory construction and legislative history.9"
The court then turned to the district court's holding that prosecuting Emerson for
violation of § 922(g)(8) would deprive him of his Fifth Amendment due process
rights.' The court agreed with the district court that "a certain mens rea is required"
because there is nothing "inherently evil or suspect" about firearms ownership.'"
However, the court rejected the district court's conclusion that Emerson's due process
rights were violated because he lacked specific notice that he was in violation of "an
obscure criminal provision" for merely possessing a firearm while subject to a
restraining order.' The court found that two Supreme Court cases helped to clarify
the requisite mens rea required of criminal statutes in order to pass due process
muster.' °2 The cases stood for the proposition that it is not necessary that a defendant
know that possession of a machine gun is unlawful, he must only know that the
weapon possessed was a machine gun." 3 Because Emerson clearly knew that he
possessed a firearm of the kind covered by the statute (when he purchased his pistol
major shot across the bow. This is the first decision to say that the Second Amendment
prohibits Congress from imposing special laws concerning gun ownership. That is why his
decision is so worrisome." Id. The Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence labeled the
Emerson decision a "[r]enegade [d]ecision." The Second Amendment, at
http://www.bradycainpaign.org/factsissuebriefssecond.asp.
94. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, TakingtheSecondAmendmentSeriously, WEEKLYSTANDARD,
July 24, 2000, at 21. Professor Lund praised Judge Cummings, stating that it "is time for the
courts to stop substituting ill-considered policy preferences for the legally binding wisdom
embodied in the Constitution." Id. at 26.
95. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert denied., 122 S. Ct. 2362
(2002) (mem.). The panel included Circuit Judges Garwood, DeMoss, and Parker.
96. Id. at212.
97. Id. at 213.
98. Id. at 213-15.
99. Id. at 215-17.
100. Id. at216-17.
101. Id. at215-16.
102. Id. at 216 (citing Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), and Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994)).
103. Id. at216-17.
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he signed a federal form that gave notice of prohibitions covered by § 922(g)(8)) the
court held that Emerson's due. process rights were not violated. °4 Thus, the court
found that the district court erred in granting Emerson's motion to dismiss the
indictment because it violated his due process rights."rs
The court, having quickly dispensed with Emerson's Fifth Amendment due process
arguments, next turned to Emerson's Second Amendment defense. This portion of the
Fifth Circuit's opinion is extraordinary; where Judge Cummings embarked on a
lengthy and scholarly exploration of the meaning of the Second Amendment, Judge
Garwood-writing for the Fifth Circuit panel-filled over seventy pages of his
opinion with a detailed analysis of the Second Amendment that dwarfed Judge
Cummings's memorandum opinion."
Judge Garwood first gave a quick overview of the differing interpretations of the
Second Amendment 7 before turning to the doctrine of stare decisis in attempting to
find the correct interpretation. Judge Garwood engaged in a thorough exploration of
the meaning of the Supreme Court's Miller decision.' Rather than resorting to a
conclusory and perfunctory restatement of what conventional Second Amendment
doctrine in the courts had read Miller to mean,"° Judge Garwood looked beyond the
Court's language to the actual brief submitted by the government in that case. The
government's brief included two basic arguments, the first a restatement of the
sophisticated collective rights model,"' and the second an assertion that the Second
Amendment relates only to "the right of the people to keep and bear arms for lawful
purposes" and formilitarypurposes pursuantto the commondefense (andthus sawed-
offshotguns or machine guns, banned by the NFA, have no legitimate use in the hands
of private individuals).'
Judge Garwood looked to the actual language of the Miller holding and concluded
that the Court had decided the case on the basis of the government's second argument,
not the first" 2 Judge Garwood also noted that the Miller opinion did not even
104. Id. at 216-17. The court also quickly affirmed the district court's conclusions in
rejecting Emerson's Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment arguments. Id. at 217-18.
105. Id. at217.
106. Many observers suspected that the Fifth Circuit's decision would be lengthy and
detailed-the court heard oral arguments in June of 2000 and did not issue its decision until
October of 2001.
107. While this Note divides the competing theories into the individual rights and collective
rights camps, Judge Garwood divided the competing theories into three camps: the states'
rights/collective rights model (arguing that the Second Amendment protects the right of states
to arm their militias); the sophisticated collective rights model (arguing that there is only a
limited individual right for members of an organized militia); and the individual rights model.
See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 218-19.
108. Id. at 221. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miller.
109. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court
Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the SecondAmendment, 26 CuMB. L. REV. 961
(1996) (arguing that, for a variety of reasons, lower courts have misread or misapplied the
Court's.actual holding in Miller).
110. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 222.
11. Id. at222-23.
112. Id. at 224 (quoting language from Miller). "In the absence of any evidence tending to
show [that a sawed-off shotgun] ... has some reasonable relationship to the preservation.or
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question whether either of the defendants in the case were members of an organized
militia, thus further reinforcing his conclusion that the Court in Miller rejected the
government's first argument." 3 Finally, Judge Garwood noted that the Miller opinion
defined the militia as comprising "all males physically capable of acting in concert for
the common defense ... bearing arms supplied by themselves.""' 4 This definition
precludes any definition of the militia as "individuals... [that] might be actively
engaged in actual military service or... those who were members of special or select
units.
, ,l15
Thus, Judge Garwood concluded, Miller does not support either a collective rights
or sophisticated collective rights interpretation of the Second Amendment."' Judge
Garwood noted that the court was "mindful that almost all of [its] sister circuits have
rejected any individual rights view of the Second Amendment."' 7" However, all of the
other circuits have rejected this view "either on the erroneous assumption that Miller
resolved the issue.or without sufficient articulated examination of the history and text
of the Second Amendment.""'.Judge Garwood then examined the text of the Second
Amendment-specifically, the meanings of "the people," "bear arms," and "keep...
arms," in addition to the words of the amendment taken as a whole." 9 He concluded
that the words "the people" have the same meaning within the Second Amendment as
within the First and Fourth Amendments. 20 Throughout the Constitution, Judge
Garwood noted, "'the people' have 'rights' and 'powers,' but federal and state
governments only have 'powers' or 'authority,' never 'rights." ' 2' Therefore, he
concluded, "the people," as used in the Constitution (including the Second
Amendment) refers to individual Americans."
Similarly, Judge Garwood looked to historical uses of "bear arms" to determine
whether the phrase refers only to militia members or whether it also extends to
carrying ofarms bycivilians." Judge Garwood concluded thatthe phrase "bear arms"
is consistent with the use of "the people" in the amendment and thus cannot be limited
only to members of the military or militia. "Keep... arms" is also devoid of a
military connotation, Judge Garwood concluded." "The plain meaning of the right
efficiency ofa well regulated militia... the Second Amendment [does not] guarantee the right
to keep and bear such an instrument." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 225.
115. Id. at226.
116. Id.
117. Id. at227.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 227-32
120. Id. at 227-29.
121. Id. at 228. Judge Garwood also pointed to previous pronouncements by the Supreme
Court as to the meaning of "the people" in cases such as United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259 (1990), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 228; see also supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
122. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 229.
123. Id. at 229-32.
124. Id. at231-32.
125. Id. at 232.
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S.. to keep arms is that it is an individual, rather than a collective, right and is not
limited to keeping arms while engaged in active military service or as a member of a
select militia such as the National Guard."'
26
Finally, Judge Garwood turned to the text of the Second Amendment as a whole
and concluded that the "[amendment's] substantive guarantee is not suggestive of a
collective rights . . . interpretation, and the implausibility of [such an interpretation]
is enhanced by ... the [amendment's] placement within the Bill of Rights."'" Judge
Garwood argued that the preamble of the Second Amendment--"A well-regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State"--fails to mandate "what would
be an otherwise implausible collective rights... interpretation of the amendment."'28
Thus, Judge Garwood summarized, "there is no need to torture the meaning of [the
amendment's] substantive guarantee into the collective rights ... model which is so
plainly inconsistent with the [amendment's] text[] [and] its placement within the bill
of rights."'29
Judge Garwood next turned to the lengthiest and most detailed portion of his
opinion, an analysis of American history leading to the adoption of the Second
Amendment." ° His historical analysis included the Federalist and Anti-Federalist
views concerning the purpose and scope of the newly proposed Constitution, and
focused on their debates with respect to providing for arming the people and the
existence of any federal standing army.' Judge Garwood summarized the ratification
debates in the states that had not simply ratified the initially proposed Constitution,
which contained no guarantee of the right of the people to be armed.' His analysis
shifted to the debates surrounding the proposal of the addition of a bill of rights to the
Constitution, including the Second Amendment."
Judge Garwood's lengthy recounting of the debates over the wording of the Second
Amendment provides a thorough exploration of the Framers' reasoning and intent
concerning the meaning of the amendment. A major theme recurring throughout the
historical debates concerned the necessity of the people to protect their liberties from
the evils posed by a standing army." In addition, the writings of constitutional
scholars of the nineteenth century further provided support for the individual rights
interpretation.' Judge Garwood concluded: "We have found no historical evidence
that the Second Amendment was intended to convey militia power to the states, limit
the federal government's power to maintain a standing army, or applies only to
members of a select militia while on active duty."' 36
Judge Garwood finalized the court's analysis of the Second Amendment by holding
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 233.
129. Id. at 236.
130. See id. at 236-60.
131. Seeid. at236-40.
132. See id. at 241-44.
133. See id. at 244.
134. See id. at 255.
135. See id. at 255-59 (citing writings by St. George Tucker, William Rawle, Justice Joseph
Story, and Thomas Cooley all supporting the individual rights interpretation).
136. Id. at260.
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that"[a]ll of the evidence indicates that the Second Amendment, like other parts of the
Bill of Rights, applies to and protects individual Americans.' 37 The court rejected the
collective rights model and held, "consistent with Miller, that [the Second
Amendment] protects the rights of individuals, including those not [a member of active
military service or a militia] to privately possess and bear their own firearms." '
Applying the court's holding to Emerson, Judge Garwood qualified the individual
right under the Second Amendment:
Although, as we have held, the Second Amendment does protect individual
rights, that does not mean that those rights may never be made subject to any
limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions orrestrictions for particular cases
that are reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of Americans generally
to individually keep and bear their private arms as historically understood in
this country.1
39
Because Emerson's Second Amendment defense was grounded on his argument that
the restraining order contained no express finding that he posed a credible threat to his
wife or child, Judge Garwood concluded that Emerson had conceded that if such
findings were present and adequately supported he could-consistent with the Second
Amendment-be precluded from possessing a firearm." 0
Although concerned with the lack of express findings in Emerson's case, the court
ultimately found Emerson's argument unpersuasive.' 4' Judge Garwood found that the
enactment of § 922(g)(8) proceeded on Congress's assumption that local laws would
not violate the "almost universal rule of American law" that temporary injunctions
issue only when there is a likelihood that irreparable harm will occur. 4 ' Because Texas
law met these minimum general standards, and the order at issue was not so
"transparently invalid" as to justify collateral review of the Texas court's order by the
federal court, the district court's finding that § 922(g)(8) violated the Second
Amendment could not stand.1
43
Thus, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Judge Cummings's holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, but concluded that
Emerson's Fifth Amendment due process rights had not been violated and the
restraining order was sufficient, "albeit likely minimally so," to support deprivation of
Emerson's Second Amendment rights." The court therefore reversed the district
court's dismissal on Second and Fifth Amendment grounds, and remanded the case
back to the district court. 45
The Fifth Circuit decision affirming Judge Cummings's holding of a Second
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 261 (emphasis in original).
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 261-62.
143. Id. at 264.
144. Id. at 264-65.
145. See id. at 265.
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Amendment individual right" immediately prompted commentary fromboth sides of
the Second Amendment debate. For example, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence declared, "[T]he court's suggestion that the Second Amendment guarantees
an individual right to be armed for reasons unrelated to militia service is based on a
gross distortion of American constitutional history and the prior rulings of the U.S.
Supreme Court."' 4 Conservative colunmistMichaelBarone predicted that inthe wake
of the Fifth Circuit decision, "it will surely be very difficult for any conscientious
Supreme Court justice to write, as other federal appeals judges have, that the Second
Amendment is just about the National Guard and that there is no individual right to
keep and bear arms.' 4
Despite Mr. Barone's perhaps hopeful suggestion that the Supreme Court might
soon revisit the Second Amendment, the Court recently declined, without comment,
to review the Fifth Circuit's decision.'49 It appears that the Court was able to continue
146. It should be noted that Judge Parker wrote a special concurrence in Emerson,
concurring in all parts of Judge Garwood's opinion except for Section V, in which Judge
Garwood concluded that there is an individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second
Amendment. See id. at 272. Judge Parker labeled this portion of the opinion as dicta, and
wrote:
The determination whether the rights bestowed by the Second Amendment are
collective or individual is entirely unnecessary to resolve this case and has no
bearing on thejudgment we dictate by this opinion. The fact that the 84 pages
of dicta contained in Section V are interesting, scholarly, and well written does
not change the fact that they are dicta and amount to at best an advisory treatise
on this long-running debate.
Id. (emphasis added). However, the court could just as easily have found no individual right
and summarily dismissed Emerson's argument; Judge Garwood's so-called "dicta" appears to
be an effort to actually give meaning to Miller and engage in an intellectually honest Second
Amendment analysis instead of merely falling back on the sort of perfunctory, conclusory
analysis in which other courts have engaged. See Denning, supra note 109.
147. Press Release, Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Brady Center Criticizes Fifth
Circuit Interpretation of the Second Amendment in Emerson Case (Oct. 17, 2001), available
at http://www.bradycampaign.orglpress/release.aspRecord=353.
148. Michael Barone, A Decision of Historic Importance, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct.
19,2001, available at http://www.usnews.coni/usnews/opinion/baroneweb/mb_011019.htm.
149. 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002) (mem.). In urging the Supreme Court not to grant Emerson's
petition for certiorari, the current Justice Department reversed "decades of official government
policy on the meaning of the Second Amendment." Linda Greenhouse, Justice Dept. Reverses
Policy on Meaning of Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at Al. The new view,
expressed in footnotes within Justice Department briefs filed in opposition to certiorari in
Emerson's case and another gun-related case, see id., stated that the Constitution "broadly
protects the rights of individuals to own" firearms. Id. The Solicitor General, Theodore Olson,
argued that the Court should not hear either appeal: "[E]ven accepting an individual right to
bear arms, the application of the laws at issue in both cases reflected the kind of narrowly
tailored restrictions by which that right could reasonably be limited." Id. The Solicitor
General's office explained that, contrary to the views expressed in the (Clinton) Justice
Department brief to the Fifth Circuit, see supra note 34, the "current position of the United
States ... is that the Second Amendment more broadly protects the rights of individuals,
including persons who are not [militia or military members] ... to possess and bear their own
firearms, subject to reasonable restrictions ... " Greenhouse, supra (emphasis added).
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its habitually deft avoidance of the issue, thus adding more confusion to the ongoing
interpretation debate."s If the Court does eventually grant certiorari in order to resolve
the apparent circuit split regarding the Second Amendment, it is impossible to say how
the Court will rule, although it is instructive to read what some of the Justices have
written on the issue. In their respective opinions, both Judge Cummings and Judge
Garwood referenced writings by Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia that seem to favor
an individual rights view.' Additionally, as shown, much of the scholarly writings
(even by academics inclined to dislike guns) seem to also favor the individual rights
view. 5
2
The Second Amendment analysis in Emerson closely tracks the writings of the
Framers on the subject of the individual right to keep and bear arms. The Court should
similarly consider the intent of the Framers if and when it rules on the issue. At the
very least, the Court should embark on a detailed scholarly exploration in the same
way the Fifth Circuit did in Emerson, rather than putting forth a vague opinion, as the
Court did in Miller, or a conclusory opinion, as have the various lower federal courts
that have assumed away any individual right. As it stands, the preponderance of the
historical evidence supports the individual rights theory, and it will be difficult for the
Court to ignore the extensive analysis set forth in Emerson.53 Clearly, however, the
Emerson decision marks a landmark reversal of the trend of lower courts to casually
dismiss individual rights theories of the Second Amendment. The growing body of
academic writings supporting the individual rights theory has been greatly bolstered
by the Fifth Circuit opinion, and the problems of municipal lawsuits against the gun
industry have taken on a new constitutional dimension.
150. See Gallia, supra note 24, at 133-34.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609 (quoting Justice
Thomas's concurrence in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)). "This Court has not
had recent occasion to consider the nature of the substantive right safeguarded by the Second
Amendment. If, however, the Second Amendment is read to confer apersonal right to 'keep
and bear arms,' a colorable argument exists that the Federal Government's regulatory scheme
... runs afoul of that Amendment's protections." Printz, 521 U.S. at 938 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
Judge Cummings also references writings by Justice Scalia supporting the conclusions of
Joyce Lee Malcolm. Emerson 46 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
137 n.13 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1997)). "It would ... be strange to find in the midst of a catalog
of the rights of individuals a provision securing to the states the right to maintain a designated
'Militia.' Dispassionate scholarship suggests quite strongly that the right of the people to keep
and bear arms meant just that." Id. (citing MALCOLM, supra note 25).
For more Second Amendment language from members of the Rehnquist Court, see Kopel,
supra note 24, at 112-31.
152. See supra Part 1.
153. It is important to point out, however, that a constitutional guarantee of an individual
right to keep and bear arms would by no means be absolute. Even if the Court rules in favor
of the individual rights theory, it is clear that all individual rights are qualified rights subject
to restrictions, as suggested by the Fifth Circuit. See supra text accompanying note 139. What
may constitute reasonable restriction of arms ownership is beyond the scope of this Note.
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C. The Incorporation Problem
In considering whethermunicipal lawsuits against the gun industry implicate Second
Amendment rights, it is not enough to stop with the debate over the meaning of the
amendment itself. As with other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Second
Amendment was originally intended to restrict action by the federal government, not
by state governments. The Fourteenth Amendment, drafted after the Civil War, was
designed to enforce fundamental citizen rights against the states." The Fourteenth
Amendment has been used to extend individual rights from the Bill of Rights against
infringement by the states as well. 5 The Supreme Court has used this tactic-known
as incorporation-to hold that certain guarantees under the Bill of Rights, such as
individual rights under the First and Fourth Amendments, are to be applied against the
states. 56 The Court, however, has avoided expressly incorporating the Second
Amendment under the Fourteenth Amendment.157
Obviously, incorporation turns on the interpretation of the right granted by the
Second Amendment. If the collective rights theorists are correct, incorporation seems
inapplicable, as it has historically protected individual rights under the Bill of Rights
against restriction by the states. If the individual rights theorists are correct, it is
curious to ponder why the Court has avoided expressly incorporating an individual
right-the right to keep and bear arms-under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Collective rights theorists, in opposition to incorporation, may point to the Court's
ruling in United States v. Cruikshank,"58 in which the Court deemed that the Second
Amendment "means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress" and that
it "is one of the amendments that [only] restrict[s] the powers of the national
government."'59 Subsequently, in Presser v. Illinois,6° the Court reiterated this point
in ruling that the Second Amendment did not prevent the State of Illinois from
restricting the rights of men "to drill or parade with arms" unless as part of a regular,
organized state militia.'
As Professor Levinson points out, however, the Court did not decide the first
154. The amendment reads: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV § 1.
155. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 25, at 652-54.
156. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROoK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 xi n.6 (1998). Halbrook cites the following examples
of cases incorporating Bill of Rights freedoms through the Fourteenth Amendment: Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Delonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897). See id.
157. Amanda B. Hill, Note, Ready, Aim, Sue: The Impact of Recent Texas Legislation on
Gun Manufacturer Liability, 31 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1387, 1430 (2000).
158. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
159. Id. at 553.
160. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
161. Id. at 267.
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"incorporation" case, Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago,'62
until eleven years after Presser, and it would be impossible to guess what the Justices
in Cruikshank and Presser thought about incorporating any of the Bill of Rights as of
the time those cases were decided. 6 Thus,
[t]he obvious question, given the modem legal reality of the incorporation of
almost all of the rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments, is what exactly justifies treating the Second Amendment as the
great exception. Why, that is, should Cruikshank and Presser be regarded as
binding precedent any morethan any ofthe other "pre-incorporation" decisions
refusing to apply given aspects of the Bill of Rights against the states?'6
It appears that any modem exclusion of the Second Amendment from incorporation
would have to rest on the premise that the amendment guarantees only a collective
right. Most likely, the incorporation question will only be answered if and when the
Supreme Court rules conclusively on the meaning of the Second Amendment.
However, the Court has expressly held that "[t]o view a particular provision of the Bill
of Rights with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted application of it. This is to
disrespect the Constitution."' 65 If the Court someday affirms the individual rights view
as espoused inEmerson, surely the Court would conclude that the Second Amendment
should be incorporated against the states as have other individual rights under the
Constitution.
The accumulated academic and historical evidence, articulated in great detail in
Emerson, strongly suggests that the Second Amendment does guarantee an individual
right to keep and bear arms; that individual right, like the individual rights guaranteed
by other provisions of the Bill of Rights, should be incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment. As such, municipalities, as governmental actors under the states, must be
subject to constitutional scrutiny when their lawsuits against the gun industry implicate
the rights of Americans to keep and bear arms. The next Part explores this concept.
II. MUNICIPAL LAWSUITS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Municipal lawsuits against the gun industry are premised on various theories of
tort.' The substantive or procedural merits of these tort theories are largely irrelevant
162. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
163. Levinson, supra note 25, at 653.
164. Id.; see also Reynolds, supra note 24, at 498 (stating that Presser was "[d]ecided in
an era when incorporation ... was not the law [and thus is] of dubious authority today").
165. Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 51, at 743.
166. The plaintiffmunicipalities generally proceed under three broad categories of alleged
liability:
(1) Firearms manufacturers and dealers employ improper distribution methods
[that] result in firearms being sold in an "illegitimate" secondary market,
(2) Manufacturers employ "unsafe" designs [that] permit "unauthorized"
persons to use the firearms, and
(3) The manufacture and sale of handguns constitutes a "public nuisance."
James H. Warner, MunicipalAnti-Gun Lawsuits: How Questionable Litigation Substitulesfor
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in evaluating the Second Amendment implications of these lawsuits. As such, it is
perhaps more important to read between the lines to find the actual purpose of most
of these lawsuits. There are troubling indications that the motivation behind these
municipal lawsuits has more to do with restricting the ability of people to have guns,
and less to do with the desire to collect damages designed to offset the financial costs
of gun violence and to punish tortfeasors in the traditional sense. But it is important to
note that even if the motives to collect damages to pay the costs of gun violence are in
good faith, the effects of such lawsuits still directly implicate the Second Amendment
rights of Americans.
This Part explores constitutional aspects of the fairly recent and novel attempts by
municipalities to bring suit against gun manufacturers. Although many of these
lawsuits have not fared well in court, the mediocre track record of these cases thus far
is largely a result of plaintiffs' failure to carry their burden under theories of tort. 67
ConsideringEmerson and the Fifth Circuit's detailed and thorough endorsement of the
individual rights theory of the Second Amendment, these lawsuits carry troubling
constitutional implications to be explored as part of ongoing litigation over guns. As
the Fifth Circuit noted in Emerson, the limits of reasonable legislation restricting
firearms has yet to be considered. This Part concludes that abusive litigation tactics by
the cities that could result in de facto gun bans by judicial fiat (bans that would extend
well beyond municipal boundaries) must surely fall into the category of the
unreasonable.
A. Opening the Floodgates: Hamilton v. Accu-Tek'
For years, the only lawsuits against gun manufacturers were filed on behalf of
private individuals, and these suits were largely unsuccessful.'69 Generally, in these
product liability suits, the plaintiffs failed to carry the day because courts have held
that guns are not defective products because they actually work as intended. 7 Despite
the failure of the vast majority of individual plaintiffs to win these lawsuits, "a number
ofmunicipal governments, perhaps emboldened by the apparent success of the lawsuits
against tobacco firms, have filed suits.' 7' This trend received an enormous boost by
the outcome at the trial level in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, the first time that gun
Legislation, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 775, 776 (2000).
167. For an excellent critique of the failings of the tort theories upon which these plaintiffs
rely, see H. Sterling Bumett, Suing Gun Manufacturers. Hazardous to Our Health, 5 Thx.
REv. L. & POL 433,467-477 (2001). Burnett suggests that allowing the large-scale litigation
assault on guns is a violation of the "well-established principle in tort law: [that] manufacturers
are usually not responsible for the criminal misuse of their products." Id. at 467. To ignore this
principle will allow the courts to "be crushed under a tide of new lawsuits and it will not be
long before the extremists among us try to use the law to shut industrial civilization down." Id.
For a contrasting, more optimistic view, see generally Frank J. Vandall, O.K. CorralI1: Policy
Issues in Municipal Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 44 ViL. L. REV. 547 (1999).
168. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated by 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
169. See Warner, supra note 166, at 775 (noting that a string of suits filed on behalf of
individual plaintiffs over a decade ago were largely unsuccessful).
170. See Peterson, supra note 16, at 483.
171. See Warner, supra note 166, at 775.
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manufacturers as an industry were held liable in tort.72
In Hamilton, the plaintiffs were the estates of six individuals killed by handguns,
plus an injured survivor and his mother." Originally, forty-nine gun manufacturers
were named defendants, but the number of defendants was later reduced to twenty-
five. 74 The remaining defendants manufactured the majority of the handguns sold in
the U.S. market. 75 The plaintiffs' complaint alleged a number of theories of liability,
such as negligent marketing and distribution practices, and based their case on a mass
tort theory.'76 No evidence connected the weapons used in the crimes to any specific
defendant.'" The plaintiffs argued that handguns could be easily obtained, regardless
of restrictive gun control laws, and this ease of access, according to the plaintiffs, was
proof of the negligent marketing practices of the defendants.'7
Judge Weinstein concluded that it was possible to show that an illegal market for
handguns led to the killings, and the case went to the jury.'79 Eventually, the jury found
that fifteen of the gun manufacturers were liable, and that nine of the defendants were
liable for the injuries of some of the plaintiffs."' One of the survivors received-
$3,950,000, but the amount was later reduced to $520,000.' The jury used a market
share method to apportion damage amounts among the defendants. 82 The upshot of
the Hamilton case is that the jury found that the defendant gun manufacturers "knew
or should have known that they were oversupplying the legitimate market, thereby
creating a pool of weapons available for the illegitimate market."'" The manufacturers
flooded the market in neighboring areas with less-restrictive gun laws, with the
inevitable result that the guns would make their way into the hands of criminals in
areas with tougher gun control laws.'
The gun manufacturers appealed the verdict, and on appeal the Second Circuit
certified two questions concerning novel issues of New York tort law to the New York
Court of Appeals: Whether gun manufacturers owed the plaintiffs a duty to avoid
negligent marketing and distribution of firearms, and if so, whether and how the
market-share theory of damages would apply in the case." 5
172. Peterson, supra note 16, at 487.
173. 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Seeid. at 808-10.
178. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1313-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
179. Id. at 1330.
180. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
181. Id. at 811.
182. See Peterson, supra note 16, at 489. Under the market share theory of liability, all of
the manufacturers of a fungible product may be held liable for injuries caused by the product;
the rule arose from litigation over cancer caused by the drug DES. See Vandall, supra note 167,
at 558-59. Applying market share liability, gun manufacturers would be held liable in
proportion to their sales in a particular market, because weapons used in crimes are often never
recovered. See id.
183. Gallia, supra note 24, at 157.
184. Id.
185. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36,46 (2d Cir. 2000).
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The New York Court of Appeals considered the questions and unanimously
answered both in the negative." 6 Considering the first question, the court noted as an
initial matter that "[a] defendant generally has no duty to control the conduct of third
persons so as to prevent them from hurting others, even where as a practical matter
defendant can exercise such control."'" After considering several theories by which
the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants owed them a duty, the court concluded that
the defendants did not owe any such duty.'
The court also made short work of the market-share liability theory imposed by
Judge Weinstein. The court distinguished Judge Weinstein's reliance on the
application of market share liability in prior New York cases involving the drug
DES.' 9 In those cases, the market-share liability was appropriate because "DES was
a fungible product and identification of the actual manufacturer that caused the injury
to a particular plaintiff was impossible."'" In contrast, the guns used to injure the
plaintiffs were not fungible, nor were the marketing tactics of each of the defendant
gun manufacturers equally negligent, thus the novel market-share theory of liability
was not appropriate.' 9'
Having received the response ofthe New York Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit
concluded that the New York court's answers to the certified questions were
definitively responsive. " The Second Circuit opinion noted that it must bear in mind
"that the highest court of a state 'has the final word on the meaning of state law. ""'
The court then went on to brush aside the plaintiffs' remaining arguments, including
assertions that the New York Court of Appeals answers were not responsive and that
the court's deference to.the state court violated jurisdictional principles.'94 Because the
New York Court of Appeals found no duty on the part of the defendants, the Second
Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court.'
The jury verdict inthe Hamilton trial caused quite a stir inthe legal community, and
the outcome encouraged numerous municipalities to file or consider suit.'96 For the
first time, a crack appeared in the gun industry's collective armor, and municipalities
were eager to take advantage of this turn of events. It is too soon to tell whether the
recent reversal of the Hamilton verdict will dampen the spirits of litigation-hungry
municipalities. What is most important about the Hamilton case is that the gun industry
became exposed to massive liability under novel theories of tort law, and
186. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
187. Id. at 1061.
188. See id. at 1061-66.'
189. See id. at 1061-62.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 240-42.
192. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2001).
193. Id. at 29 (quoting County of Westchester v. Comm'r of Transp., 9 F.3d 242, 245 (2d
Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (quoting Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Sobol, 948 F.2d 79,
84 (2d Cir. 1991)).
194. See id. at 29-31.
195. Id. at 32.
196. See Gallia, supra note 24, at 158 n.190 (listing several cities desiring to file similar
suits in the immediate aftermath of Hamilton, including Philadelphia, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Gary, Indiana).
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municipalities were thereafter encouraged to file suit against gun manufacturers.
However, while the private plaintiffs in Hamilton sought financial compensation for
their respective losses, motives of a different sort were lurking behind the publicly
announced purpose of many municipalities to seek damages for high costs of gun
violence.
B. Gun Control Through Litigation
Many lawsuits against the gun industry are at least partly motivated by the desire of
the plaintiffs to bankrupt the gun industry--"to make the manufacture and sale of
firearms so costly that the industry would give up."'97 With few exceptions, courts have
recognized these lawsuits for what they are--cynical attempts to seek judicial
legislation that effectively bans guns in the absence of action by the legislatures.'98 For
example, one of the plaintiffs in Hamilton admitted that the case "was never about
money"; the main goal of the suit was to achieve policy changes.'" This concept
carries over into the motivations behind the municipal lawsuits. For example,
municipal governments that are dissatisfied with their state legislature's efforts to
restrict gun ownership could bring suit against the gun industry in order to bring
financial pressure to bear.2" The very threat of huge liability or even the costs of
preparing for litigation could force gun industries to stop marketing to the public
altogether-this result would amount to an outright ban on the sale of guns to the
public, the equivalent of a legislative ban on guns. But, as one shrewd commentator
noted, "'the idea that courts should act because legislatures, or the public, have been
intimidated by the 'gun lobby'. . . [shows a] misunderstanding of political branches of
the government' and how [government] works."'
The words of some of the players involved in the municipal lawsuits reveal the true
motivations behind these suits. In 1998, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley filed suit
against the firearms industry, alleging that the gun industry "created a public nuisance
by 'trafficking' a large number of guns into Chicago," with knowledge that the guns
would end up in criminals' hands. 2 Daley, however, cut right to the point when he
197. Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 51, at 750.
198. See id.
199. Peterson, supra note 16, at 502-03. While the plaintiff in Hamilton was a private
plaintiff, her admission aptly illustrates the concept of seeking judicial action in the absence
of favorable policy legislation. Although action by private plaintiffs cannot violate Americans'
Second Amendment rights, Americans ought to be suspicious of legal action by any
plaintiff-private or government-that has as its purpose the restriction of constitutional rights
with which the plaintiff does not agree. See generally Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 51.
200. See Warner, supra note 166, at 775-76 ("[I]t appears that the ulterior motive behind
[private and municipal] lawsuits was the desire, by the anti-gun movement, to use the courts
to restrict the private ownership of handguns, since it was not possible to do so through
legislation.")
201. Peterson, supra note 16, at 503 (quoting Philip D. Oliver, Rejecting the "Whipping-
Boy" Approach to Tort Law: Well-Made Handguns Are Not Defective Products, 14 U. ARK.
LrrTLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 5 (1991)) (omissions and first and second alteration in original; third
alteration added).
202. Hill, supra note 157, at 1412.
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admitted that the purpose of the lawsuit was to hit them "right where it hurts-in their
bank accounts."'2 3 Chicago may indeed bear costs from gun violence, but the mayor's
remarks show that an underlying (perhaps the primary) motive for the suit was simply
to bankrupt the gun industry through the courts.'
Chicago's situation well illustrates the motives of many of the municipal plaintiffs.
Chicago has extremely restrictive gun laws-handgun sales and private ownership of
handguns not lawfully registered prior to 1982 are prohibited.0 5 However, despite the
severe restrictions on the legal ownership of firearms in Chicago, the city apparently
suffers from violent crime involving the use of firearms. The lawsuit filed on behalf
of Chicago alleged that the firearms manufacturers flooded areas just beyond the city's
boundaries (areas with less-restrictive gun laws) with the knowledge that these excess
weapons would eventually make their way to Chicago to be used in crimes. 6 If this
theory is correct, it suggests that Mayor Daley and other officials of the city of Chicago
were frustrated by the fact that the Illinois Legislature (and perhaps the smaller
government entities adjacent to the city) had not enacted gun control legislation as
severe as the legislation enacted by Chicago itself. Massive damage awards or even the
threat of highly expensive litigation would achieve the de facto equivalent of such
strict gun control by bludgeoning gun manufacturers into submission-and, of course,
the litigation could have the added benefit of enriching the city's coffers along the way.
Strategies like Mayor Daley's may be nothing more than shrewd maneuvering
within the confines of acceptable litigation to achieve good faith results, such as the
massive litigation against the tobacco industry seeking to recover healthcare costs. But
the gun industry is nowhere near the financial juggernaut that is the tobacco industry.
To compare, in 1998 the annual sales for the entire gun industry totaled about $1.4
billion, while the tobacco companies racked up approximately $45 billion. 7 It seems
clear that the motive of at least some of the municipalities is to take advantage of the
relative financial weakness of the gun industry. The plan is to get "so many lawyers to
launch so many lawsuits so fast in so many places that the firearm industry simply
splinters and disintegrates.""Z°s Indeed, Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell called for "as
many as one hundred suits to be filed on the same day to overwhelm the industry."2'
Another observer explained that if "they can get 20 suits going on, they could raise the
cost to the gun manufacturers to $1 million a day. ' 210
There is some indication that big cities recognize the value of this tactic. Gun
203. Id. at 1413.
204. Id.
205. See Jill R. Baniewicz, Note, Is Hamilton v. Accu-Tek a Good Predictor of What the
Future Holds for Gun Manufacturers?, 34 IND. L. REv. 419,438 (2001).
206. See id. In order to substantiate the city's claims, the Chicago Police Department
embarked on "Operation Gunsmoke," in which undercover police officers conducted a sting
operation against gun shops just outside the city limits. See Segalla, supra note 11, at 382.
Allegedly, undercover "agents without proper I.D. purchased handguns from dealers after
bragging they would use the firearms in criminal enterprises or resell them to drug gangs." Id.
207. Segalla, supra note 11, at 369.
208. Hill, supra note 157, at 1413.
209. Id.
210. Baniewicz, supra note 205, at 444 (quoting remarks by Cardozo law professor Lester
Brickman).
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litigation was a hot topic of discussion at the U.S. Conference of Mayors in 1999."
A concerted effort to unite and crush the gun industry is further indicated by private
efforts by organizations such as the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence and the
Firearms Litigation Clearing House, both actively offering assistance via the Internet
and encouraging municipalities to file suit.2 '2 The massive damage awards sought by
municipal plaintiffs also seem to support this tactic of swamping the gun industry with
bankrupting claims. Chicago, for example, sought $433 million in damages,2 " and
Boston's complaint sought "at least $100 million. 21 4 While Mayor Rendell's call for
one hundred simultaneous suits has not yet occurred,2 5 it is easy to see how such a
strategy would be financially debilitating for the gun industry. Providing further
evidence of the willingness of municipal plaintiffs to take a page out of the successful
tobacco play book (seeking overwhelming damages), New Orleans retained the law
firm of Gauthier, Downing, LaBarre, Besler, & Dean, high-profile veterans of the
tobacco litigation.1 6 Such veterans of the tobacco litigation know full well that the
firearms industry has nowhere near the deep pockets of the tobacco defendants.
While the gun industry has not yet been driven into mass bankruptcy, it is apparent
that that the mere threat of massive litigation has had an effect. In the wake of the surge
of municipal litigation, Colt Manufacturing, a leading gun manufacturer, announced
that it would stop marketing guns to the civilian market, perhaps fearing exposure to
massive liability.2"7 Other manufacturers have already gone bankrupt because of the
costs of litigation.2 8 Perhaps the most conspicuous casualty to date of the threat of
211. Segalla, supra note 11, at 377-78.
212. Id. at 378.
213. Id. at382.
214. Id. at 386.
215. Id.
216. See Trapolin, supra note 17, at 1286 & n.71.
217. See Segalla, supra note 11, at 369-70; see also Adam Cohen, Are Lawyers Running
America?, TIME, July 17, 2000, at 25 (indicating that Colt dropped civilian marketing and
focused instead on military and police markets); Burnett, supra note 167, at 481 (stating that
Colt was "unable to get loans... because banks were unwilling to finance the manufacturer
with lawsuits hanging over its head which 'could be worth zero, or a trillion dollars."').
Perhaps as a result of the recent failures of the municipal lawsuits, Colt has apparently gotten
back in the business of marketing firearms to the civilian public. See Massad Ayoob, What's
Happening to Colt? An Interview with General William Keys, USMC (Ret.), CEO of Colt's,
HANDGUNS, Feb. 2002, at 52 ("[W]e're happy to sell any of the rifles and any of the handguns
to any private citizen who is eligible to buy one.").
218. See Segalla, supra note, 11 at 370; see also Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 51, at 768
(describing Maryland Court of Appeals decision imposing strict liability on a manufacturer of
"Saturday Night Specials" that subsequently went out of business). The court's decision was
later nullified by state legislation, but the gun manufacturer went out of business in the
meantime-a result "cheered as a model by gun prohibition strategists." Id.
Kopel and Gardiner also mention the demise of a company that manufactured the infamous
"Hell-Fire Device," a device that attached to the trigger of semi-automatic firearms and offered
"[Walter] Mittyish owners the'feel' ofautomatic weapons fire without actuallymaking the gun
fire automatically." Id. at 769. The manufacturer declared bankruptcy after being sued in a
lawsuit "orchestrated by the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence." Id. The company's
president explained that ."since we cannot afford the huge legal fees required to defend this
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massive litigation was Smith & Wesson, which signed a highly publicized settlement
agreement in 2000.219
The agreement contained a number of provisions, including a Smith & Wesson
pledge to develop "smart gun" technology and more sophisticated safety
innovations?" And, in a move that caused even more controversy, Smith & Wesson
agreed to require any dealer of its firearms to abide by certain restrictions, such as a
strict code of conduct and a requirement that no such dealer will "handle high capacity
magazines or assault weapons, nor sell any Smith & Wesson product to anyone who
has not taken a certified firearms safety class or passed a safety exam.""' The company
admitted that the agreement was necessary to avoid closing shop altogether.2n The
agreement was noteworthy in that it was at least partially motivated by the threat of the
federal government's involvement via the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") in suits against unnamed members of the gun industry. 3
As an immediate result of Smith & Wesson's agreement, a number of cities dropped
the gun manufacturer from their lawsuits; thirteen other cities, however, went forward
with their original claims against Smith & Wesson despite the manufacturer's
agreement?' On the positive side for Smith & Wesson, local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies began giving preference to the embattled gun manufacturer in
the award of weapon purchase contracts.? In addition, exemplifying the coercive
pressure brought to bear against gun companies that stood their ground against signing
similar agreements, a number ofstate attorneys general initiated antitrust investigations
against these companies and other organizations that had boycotted Smith & Wesson
in protest of the company's having broken ranks with other embattled gun
manufacturers.'
ridiculous claim, and since a successful defense would still put us out of business, we are left
with no alternative other than closing the doors."' Id. (quoting Suit Causes Hellfire
Bankruptcy, FIREARM Bus., Nov. 1, 1994, at 5).
219. See Bogus, supra note 12, at 1357. Smith & Wesson's agreement was a "pact with
[HUD], the Department ofthe Treasury, the New York and Connecticut Attorneys General, and
the mayors of many of the cities suing the gun industry at that time." Burnett, supra note 167,
at 481.
220. See Burnett, supra note 167, at 482. For a complete description of each element of the
agreement, see id. at 481-82.
221. Id. at482.
222. Hill, supra note 157, at 1413-14.
223. See Bogus, supra note 12, at 1357-58. HUD magnanimously announced that Smith
& Wesson's agreement would make further lawsuits against the company in the future
"unnecessary." Burnett, supra note 167, at 483.
224. See Trapolin, supra note 17, at 1291.
225. See id. at 1293. HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo called on "federal agencies and the
nation's police departments to favor companies that signed agreements [like Smith &
Wesson's]." Burnett, supra note 167, at 483.
226. See Trapolin, supra note 17, at 1292. In an ironic twist to the travails of Smith &
Wesson, the company endured a concerted boycott campaign bymanyhard-lineprogun groups
and individuals who labeled the embattled gun company "Slick & Worthless." See Tanya
Metaksa, Slick& Worthless, available at http://downloads.slingshots.com/slickless.html. The
gun industry "turned its back on Smith & Wesson"; the mounting litigation costs and boycott
pressures induced the company's British owner to sell the company in May 2001. See Burnett,
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In the years following the rush on the courts, the claims of many municipalities have
met with failure. The trial verdict in Hamilton, the case that excited so much attention
among antigun organizations and big city mayors, was reversed by the Second Circuit.
Similarly, lawsuits brought by New Orleans, Bridgeport, Philadelphia, and other cities
have resulted in defeat for the plaintiffs. 7 However, as of the time of this writing, a
number of lawsuits are still pending at various stages, and with the stakes so high, any
one lawsuit resulting in massive damages against the defendants could bankrupt the
gun industry. 8 The following sub-Part considers the practical and constitutional
effects of the continuing litigation.
C. How Will the People Acquire the Arms They
Have a Right to Keep and Bear?
Those who believe that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to
keep and bear arms may be comforted by the cities' relative lack of success thus far
in the courts. However, they should not let such failures-which seem to be largely
confined to either procedural deficiencies or substantive failings under tort law-blind
them to the very real constitutional considerations that arise out of the lawsuits.
Criticisms of the effort to bankrupt the gun industry should go beyond merely attacking
the lawsuits as frivolous, or as substantively flawed on the issue of causation. 9 As
already suggested, the municipal lawsuits at the very least may be an improper attempt
to use the judicial system to do an end-run around legislatures. But an even more
troubling feature is that the end-run represented by these lawsuits directly affects the
Second Amendment rights of Americans. Even if the defendant gun manufacturers end
up prevailing on the merits in court, the prohibitively large expenses of fighting every
municipal lawsuit will likely coerce manufacturers to agree to restrictive settlement
terms, to stop marketing guns to the civilian market, or to go bankrupt." These results
will eventually have the practical effect of denying Americans the constitutional right
to keep and bear arms.
In the past, courts have been reluctant to allow the judiciary to be used to decide
supra note 167, at 482-83 & nn.227-28.
227. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 217 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002)
(dismissing suit because ofremote causation and lack ofstanding); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 200 1) (ruling that Bridgeport and its mayor lacked standing to bring
suit); Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001) (ruling that New Orleans's suit
was properly barred by a state statute preempting lawsuits by Louisiana cities).
228. The Web site for the International Action Network on Small Arms ("IANSA"), a
supporter of the municipal litigation, has a complete listing of current and pending lawsuits as
of October 11, 2001. See International Action Network on Small Arms, Gun Lawsuits: The
Industry s Deceptive Scoreboard, at http:/www.iansa.org/news/2001/oct _ 01/gun_ law.htm.
Interestingly, the IANSA Web site illustrates that the acrimony over the lawsuits even extends
to conflicts over whether antigun or progun interests have been served by the results of the
municipal litigation-IANSA accuses progun groups of attempting to cast outcomes of most
of the litigation as favorable to the gun manufacturer defendants. See id.
229. See, e.g., Bumann, supra note 16. For a good summary of causation issues pertaining
to the municipal suits, see generally Vandall, supra note 167.
230. See generally Baniewicz, supra note 205.
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issues best left to legislative deliberation."3 Federal courts, in particular, have been
particularly vigilant against the idea that courts should legislate gun policy.' 2 For
example, in Martin v. Harrington & Richardson,3 the Seventh Circuit noted that the
"right of private citizens in Illinois to bear arms is protected by . the Illinois
Constitution."' To impose liability on the sale of handguns, the court held, would "in
practice drive manufacturers out ofbusiness[] [and] would produce a handgun ban by
judicial fiat in the face of the decision by Illinois to allow its citizens to possess
handguns." ' "Js Similarly, in Wasylow v. Glock Inc.,"' a federal district court declared
that the legislature is the proper body to make policy decisions relating to gun
control."' Mere frustration with the failure of the legislature to enact legislation to curb
handgun violence should notbe enough to justify judicially created policy changes, the
court concluded." Many state courts have come to the same conclusion.' 9
This litigation, or the threat of such litigation, therefore, effectively substitutes for
legitimate legislative action. Americans should be suspicious of efforts by private
parties or the government to seek policy objectives through recourse to the courts when
such parties are unable to achieve their objectives through appropriate legislative
means. Moreover, the courts rejecting such litigation as improper usurpation of
legislative functions did not have the benefit of any clear judicial precedents affirming
an individual right to keep and bear arms. The Fifth Circuit's Emerson decision
represents a significant change in how these lawsuits should be evaluated and its
rationale may provide a potent defense against this type of litigation.
Thus, it appears that the pressures brought to bear by these lawsuits have
constitutional implications beyond economic coercion. This becomes more apparent
by analogizing the guarantees of the First and Second Amendments. The First
Amendment, for example, has been ruled a fundamental right, in light of the fact that
it enumerates rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."240 The
text of the Second Amendment arguably makes a similar explicit or implicit guarantee,
especially considering the well-supported individual rights view articulatedby the Fifth
Circuit in Emerson. David Kopel and Richard Gardiner have made the same argument
using the classic First Amendment case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,24' which
spawned "The Sullivan Principles," the doctrine which allows the courts to "impose
restrictions on traditional torts to protect Constitutional rights." '42
231. See Burnett, supra note 167, at 464.
232. See id. at 465.
233. 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984).
234. Id. at 1204.
235. Id.
236. 975 F. Supp. 370 (D. Mass. 1996).
237. Id. at380-81.
238. See id.
239. For a-description of some of these cases, see Burnett, supra note 167, at 465-66.
240. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,33 (1973).
241. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
242. Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 5 1, at 737. The Court held that "[W]hat a State may not
constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its
civil law of libel. The fear of damage[s] ... maybe markedly more inhibiting than the fear of
prosecution under a criminal statute." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added). The Court
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In Sullivan, the plaintiff was a public official suing the New York Times for
publishing a libelous story about the plaintiff. 3 The Supreme Court sharply restricted
the common law tort remedy of libel because of the potential danger of abusive civil
litigation infringing the exercise of a constitutional right.2' According to Kopel and
Gardiner, Sullivan in part stood for the proposition that public officials have broad
immunity from suits over statements made in the course of official duties.4 Similarly,
citizens who criticize government officials also enjoy broad immunity.2" The
government immunity concept should also apply to tort protection of the Second
Amendment. Kopel and Gardiner explain:
Governments are immune from suit for failure ... to protect citizens from
crime. Governments are similarly immune from suit by victims who were
injured by criminals who were given early release on parole. Accordingly, it
would be highly inappropriate for the government, through the courts, to make
it economically impossible for persons to own handguns for [defense] .... If
the Judiciary will not question the government's civil immunity for failure to
protect people, the government's courts certainly should not let themselves
become a vehicle that deprives people of the [means] to protect themselves.247
For the government or the judiciary to allow common law torts to infringe
constitutional rights "amounts to unlawful state action that is barred by the Fourteenth
Amendment... [and the] judiciary has an affirmative obligation to prevent such
infringement.s
248
Kopel and Gardiner analyze the scope of the Second Amendment by analyzing the
textual guarantees of the amendment; their analysis follows a path similar to the
analysis of Judge Cummings and Judge Garwood in their respective opinions. 249 As did
the Emerson courts, Kopel and Gardiner conclude that the Second Amendment
guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms, and "like the freedom of speech
and the press, [that right] is an enumerated Constitutional right entitled to judicial
protection." ' Thus, the guarantees of the Second Amendment, like other recognized
fundamental rights, ought to be incorporated against the states and rigorously
defended.
The economic impossibility of owning a gun could become a reality if the
municipalities are permitted to carry forward their avalanche of questionable lawsuits.
Unlike First Amendment free speech rights, which people are bom with the means to
exercise, the Second Amendment necessarily requires an outside means to enable its
reined in litigation that would infringe constitutional rights; courts should similarly rein in
frivolous attempts to restrict the Second Amendment.
243. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-59.
244. Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 51, at 737.
245. Id. at 747.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 748 (emphasis added).
248. Id. at 773.
249. See id. at 738-41. Compare this analysiswith thejudges' analysessupra Parts II.A. and
II.B.
250. Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 5 1, at 743.
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exercise. In other words, if there is a right to keep and bear arms, it seems a stretch to
suggest that this right extends only to the natural weapons we are born with--fists,
feet, and teeth. Truly, "[w]hile all other animals are born with defensive weapons
which they cannot remove, humans are born with the capacity for reason and the
physical ability to make [arms] to protect themselves."'
Without commenting on the wisdom (let alone the constitutionality) ofbig city laws
that essentially ban private gun ownership, the municipal lawsuits against the gun
industry clearly haje the effect of imposing an indirect sort of gun control extending
beyond municipal boundaries. One can envision how large money damage awards in
only a few trials could effectively shut down a substantial portion of the gun industry.
This would amount to an elimination of the means by which millions of Americans
would exercise their constitutional rights---"[i]f there are no guns because
manufacturers are driven out of business, then it wouldbe impossible for an individual
to own or to bear a gun." '' While there are undoubtedly many who would cheer this
result, Americans should be wary of assuming away a very real constitutional right by
virtue oftheir policy views. Just as Americans should cherish the First Amendment for
protecting even unpopular speech, so should they cherish their rights protected by the
Second Amendment (even if they choose not to exercise them) and be suspicious of
efforts to render these rights meaningless.' 3
One could argue that even if the gun industry did go out of business, and there were
therefore no new guns on the market, the fact that there are well over 200 million guns
in America already ensures that there will be plenty left over for people to have to
exercise their Second Amendment rights. Aside from the fact that government-induced
scarcity would drive up the prices on the remaining "grandfathered" guns, it seems
disingenuous to suggest that exercise of a constitutional right should depend on
previously existing channels. This would be analogous to the Supreme Court in
Sullivan having come out the opposite way by recognizing the expansive defamation
standard argued for by the plaintiff. Such a result would effectively shut down startup
of new newspapers because of fears of liability, leaving the Court to appease an
outraged public by reassuring that there are more than enough existing newspapers in
operation (with adequate insurance and highly paid lawyers) to print news and views,
and thus everyone's rights under the First Amendment are amply protected.
Luckily for the gun manufacturers, many states have taken steps to curb the potential
abuses coming from these municipal lawsuits.' These preemptive measures include
legislation by states to preclude their municipalities from pursuing litigation against
251. Stephen P. Halbrook, Tort Liability for the Manufacture, Sale, and Ownership of
Handguns?, 6 HAMIvUNE L. REV. 351,382 (1983).
252. Hill, supra note 157, at 1432.
253. Kopel and Gardiner point out that, in response to their attempt to analogize the First
and Second Amendments, it could be argued that speech does not harm people, but guns do.
See Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 51, at 748. However, the authors point out that "[t]he
holocaust ended with gas chambers, but began with words, the words of hat[e]mongers like
Hitler .... Even so, Nazi speech, not to mention dangerous philosophy, is protected under the
Constitution, as is sexually oriented speech which promotes sexism and rape." Id. at 748. It
would seem to be an especially specious argument to declare that the First Amendment has
value and the Second Amendment does not because guns kill people and words do not.
254. Peterson, supra note 16, at 497-98.
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the gun industry. Other measures have been introduced in the United States Congress
to achieve similar ends on a national scale." But, as argued earlier, only a few high-
dollar judgments or settlements in isolated areas of the country could render all such
preventive measures moot. These legislative efforts, though well-intentioned, are
subject to short-sighted political whim. At any rate, any honest assessment of the scope
of the Second Amendment by the Court that undertakes as thorough an analysis as
those of Judge Cummings and Judge Garwood would render such legislative efforts
unnecessary. The courts must make a serious effort to abide by the Sullivan Principles
and protect the Second Amendment from unreasonable litigation in the same way that
the courts have zealously protected the First Amendment. The judiciary must
affrmatively fight efforts to coopt the legal system in an effort to bypass any
disfavored provisions of the Constitution.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The debate over whether the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to
keep and bear arms will continue to simmer, at least until the Supreme Court resolves
the issue once and for all. The weight of academic authority leans in the direction of
an individual rights meaning. Along with the two Emerson decisions, the only
thorough judicial analyses of the Second Amendment to date, this recent trend of
authority suggests that the amendment should be afforded the full protection that other
fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights enjoy. For this reason, the courts should be as
suspicious of improper attempts to restrict Second Amendment freedoms as they are
of threats to First Amendment freedoms, or any other individual rights under the
Constitution.
Without question, municipal lawsuits against the gun industry have the potential to
directly infringe the rights of Americans to keep and bear arms. In sum, the
"harassment lawsuits ...will risk chilling the exercise of Second Amendment
rights. 2 5 6 The Fifth Circuit in Emerson properly recognized that the amendment
protects an individual right to keep and bear arms. The Supreme Court made the right
decision in Sullivan, when it ruled that common law tort claims should not be allowed
to infringe our constitutional rights. The courts should look to these holding and
restrict the ability ofmunicipal plaintiffs to infringe Second Amendment rights through
massive litigation against the gun industry.
255. Id. at 499.
256. Kopel & Gardiner, supra note 51, at 774.
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